



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION I  
475 ALLENDALE ROAD  
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-1415

November 22, 2011

Mr. Kenneth Langdon, Vice President  
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC  
Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC  
P.O. Box 63  
Lycoming, NY 13093

SUBJECT: NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION – NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION  
AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000220/2011008 AND  
05000410/2011008

Dear Mr. Langdon:

On October 21, 2011, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection results discussed with Mr. George Gellrich and other members of your staff.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to identification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

Based on the samples selected for review, the inspectors concluded that Constellation was generally effective in identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems. Nine Mile Point personnel identified problems and entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold. Nine Mile Point personnel prioritized and evaluated issues commensurate with the safety significance of the problems and corrective actions were generally implemented in a timely manner.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Glenn T. Dentel", followed by the word "for" in a smaller, simpler script.

Glenn T. Dentel, Chief  
Projects Branch 1  
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 50-220, 50-410  
License Nos.: DPR-63, NPF-69

Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000220/2011008 and 05000410/2011008  
w/Attachment: Supplementary Information

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K. Langdon

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Sincerely,

**/RA by Raymond J. Powell for/**  
Glenn T. Dentel, Chief  
Projects Branch 1  
Division of Reactor Projects

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NAME	NPerryNP	RPowell/RJP	GDentel/NP for by phone
DATE	11/21 /11	11/21/11	11/21/11

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**U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION****REGION I**

Docket No.: 50-220, 50-410

License No.: DPR-63, NPF-69

Report No.: 05000220/2011008; 05000410/2011008

Licensee: Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC (NMPNS)

Facility: Nine Mile Point, Units 1 and 2

Location: Oswego, NY

Dates: October 3 through 21, 2011

Team Leader: Neil Perry, Senior Project Engineer, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)

Inspectors: D. Dempsey, Resident Inspector, DRP  
N. Lafferty, Project Engineer, DRP  
K. Cronk, Project Engineer, DRP  
T. Ziev, Reactor Engineer, DRP

Approved by: Glenn T. Dentel, Chief  
Projects Branch 1  
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000220/2011008, 05000410/2011008; 10/03/2011 - 10/21/2011; Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Biennial Baseline Inspection of Problem Identification and Resolution.

This NRC team inspection was performed by four regional inspectors and one resident inspector. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.

### Problem Identification and Resolution

The inspectors concluded that Constellation was generally effective in identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems. Constellation personnel identified problems, entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold, and prioritized issues commensurate with their safety significance. In most cases, Constellation appropriately screened issues for operability and reportability, and performed causal analyses that appropriately considered extent of condition, generic issues, and previous occurrences. The inspectors also determined that Constellation typically implemented corrective actions to address the problems identified in the corrective action program in a timely manner.

The inspectors concluded that, in general, Constellation adequately identified, reviewed, and applied relevant industry operating experience to Nine Mile Point operations. In addition, based on those items selected for review, the inspectors determined that Constellation's self-assessments and audits were thorough.

Based on the interviews the inspectors conducted over the course of the inspection, observations of plant activities, and reviews of individual corrective action program and employee concerns program issues, the inspectors did not identify any indications that site personnel were unwilling to raise safety issues nor did they identify any conditions that could have had a negative impact on the site's safety conscious work environment.

No findings were identified.

## REPORT DETAILS

### 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

#### 4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152B)

This inspection constitutes one biennial sample of problem identification and resolution as defined by Inspection Procedure 71152. All documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.

#### .1 Assessment of Corrective Action Program Effectiveness

##### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the procedures that described Constellation's corrective action program at Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (NMPNS). To assess the effectiveness of the corrective action program, the inspectors reviewed performance in three primary areas: problem identification, prioritization and evaluation of issues, and corrective action implementation. The inspectors compared performance in these areas to the requirements and standards contained in 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," and Constellation procedure CNG-CA-1.01-1000, "Corrective Action Program." For each of these areas, the inspectors considered risk insights from the station's risk analysis and reviewed condition reports (CRs) selected across the seven cornerstones of safety in the NRCs Reactor Oversight Process. Additionally, the inspectors attended multiple Plan-of-the-Day meetings, screening meetings, and Management Review Committee meetings. The inspectors selected items from the following functional areas for review: engineering, operations, maintenance, emergency preparedness, radiation protection, chemistry, physical security, and oversight programs.

##### (1) Effectiveness of Problem Identification

In addition to the items described above, the inspectors reviewed system health reports, a sample of completed corrective and preventive maintenance work orders, completed surveillance test procedures, and periodic trend reports. The inspectors also completed field walkdowns of various systems on site, such as the emergency diesel generator (EDG) and liquid poison systems. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of CRs written to document issues identified through internal self-assessments, audits, emergency preparedness drills, and the operating experience program. The inspectors completed this review to verify that Constellation entered conditions adverse to quality into their corrective action program as appropriate.

##### (2) Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues

The inspectors reviewed the evaluation and prioritization of a sample of CRs issued since the last NRC biennial Problem Identification and Resolution inspection completed in October 2009. The inspectors also reviewed CRs that were assigned lower levels of significance that did not include formal cause evaluations to ensure that they were properly classified. The inspectors' reviews included the appropriateness of the assigned significance, the scope and depth of the causal analysis, and the timeliness of resolution. The inspectors assessed whether the evaluations identified likely causes for the issues and developed appropriate corrective actions to address the identified

causes. Further, the inspectors reviewed equipment operability determinations, reportability assessments, and extent-of-condition reviews for selected problems to verify these processes adequately addressed equipment operability, reporting of issues to the NRC, and the extent of the issues.

(3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions

The inspectors reviewed Constellation's completed corrective actions through documentation review and, in some cases, field walkdowns to determine whether the actions addressed the identified causes of the problems. The inspectors also reviewed CRs for adverse trends and repetitive problems to determine whether corrective actions were effective in addressing the broader issues. The inspectors reviewed Constellation's timeliness in implementing corrective actions and effectiveness in precluding recurrence for significant conditions adverse to quality. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of CRs associated with selected non-cited violations (NCVs) and findings to verify that Constellation personnel properly evaluated and resolved these issues. In addition, the inspectors expanded the corrective action review to five years to evaluate Constellation actions related to Unit 1 liquid poison deficiencies and Unit 2 feedwater issues.

b. Assessment

(1) Effectiveness of Problem Identification

Based on the selected samples, plant walkdowns, and interviews of site personnel in multiple functional areas, the inspectors determined that Constellation generally identified problems and entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold. Constellation staff at NMPNS initiated approximately 23,000 CRs between October 2009 and September 2011. The inspectors observed supervisors at the Plan-of-the-Day meetings, screening meetings, and Management Review Committee meetings appropriately questioning and challenging CRs to ensure clarification of the issues. Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that Constellation trended equipment and programmatic issues, and appropriately identified problems in CRs. The inspectors verified that conditions adverse to quality identified through this review were entered into the corrective action program as appropriate. Additionally, the inspectors concluded that personnel were identifying trends at low levels. Although issues and concerns were generally identified and entered into the corrective action program, the inspectors identified some instances not yet identified by Constellation including the Unit 2 EDG air start system valves inadequately locked, carts improperly stored in the power block, broken clips on the 103 EDG valve covers, and water on the floor in the 102 EDG switchgear room.

The inspectors independently evaluated these deficiencies for significance in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Appendix B, "Issue Screening," and IMC 0612, Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues." None of the examples had a significant impact on plant operations or equipment operability. The inspectors considered these issues to be of minor significance, and, as a result, not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy.

(2) Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues

The inspectors determined that, in general, Constellation appropriately prioritized and evaluated issues commensurate with the safety significance of the identified problem. Constellation screened CRs for operability and reportability, categorized the CRs by significance, and assigned actions to the appropriate department for evaluation and resolution. The CR screening process considered human performance issues, radiological safety concerns, repetitiveness, adverse trends, and potential impact on the safety conscious work environment.

Based on the sample of CRs reviewed, the inspectors noted that the guidance provided by Constellation corrective action program implementing procedures appeared sufficient to ensure consistency in categorization of issues. Operability and reportability determinations were generally performed when conditions warranted and in most cases, the evaluations supported the conclusion. Causal analyses appropriately considered the extent of condition or problem, generic issues, and previous occurrences of the issue. However, the inspectors identified an unresolved item (URI) where NMPNS personnel were not effective in evaluating an issue and implementing effective corrective actions. This URI is documented in Section 4OA2.1.c.

(3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions

The inspectors concluded that corrective actions for identified deficiencies were generally timely and adequately implemented. For significant conditions adverse to quality, Constellation identified actions to prevent recurrence. The inspectors concluded that corrective actions to address the sample of NRC NCVs and findings since the last problem identification and resolution inspection were timely and effective. The inspectors did observe some weaknesses in Constellation's resolution of degraded conditions. For example:

- A corrective action was not completed as detailed in the corrective action program for adding a step to a maintenance procedure for the Unit 2 EDGs regarding adding a normal temperature band for the jacket water system. The temperature band was for trending and did not affect alarms that the operators would receive for abnormal temperatures.
- A corrective action was not completed for adding a step to an operations procedure for draining the reactor cavity regarding establishing the accuracy of the utilized level indications. Numerous other actions were taken to ensure the reactor cavity draining would be completed in a controlled manner with accurate, redundant indication.
- An issue regarding the reduced capacity of the floor drain system in Unit 1 was identified in March and August 2011. However, corrective actions to address the issue were not aggressively pursued until October 2011.
- An adverse trend regarding poor plant lighting conditions (bulbs needing replacement) was identified in June 2011. However, long term corrective actions were not implemented until October 2011. Temporary lighting and flashlights were being relied upon until the permanent lighting was properly restored.



The inspectors independently evaluated these issues for significance in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, "Issue Screening," and IMC 0612, Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues." None of the examples had a significant impact on plant operations or equipment operability. The inspectors consider these issues to be of minor significance, and, as a result, not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy.

c. Findings

Non-Safety Related Molded-Case Circuit Breaker Preventive Maintenance

**Introduction:** The inspectors identified a URI associated with NMPNS's failure to meet the fleet standard for applying preventive maintenance (PM) templates for Critical, non-safety related (NSR) molded-case circuit breakers (MCCBs).

**Description:** In 2006, NMPNS began to apply Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) recommended PM templates to NSR MCCBs. During the application process, NMPNS classified NSR MCCBs as Critical, Significant, Economic, or Run-to-Failure, and determined the PM activities to be performed. NMPNS appropriately classified breakers and assigned PM tasks using the site procedures and industry guidance available at that time.

In 2007, two new procedures, CNG-AM-1.01-1018 "Preventive Maintenance Program," and CNG-AM-1.01-2000 "Scoping and Identification of Critical Components," were issued. CNG-AM-1.01-2000 requires a component to be classified as Critical if a functional failure would result in one of the following undesirable plant consequences: reactor scram/trip from any power level; loss of generation (shutdown, downpower/derate >20%, or delay a unit Mode Change in startup); unplanned technical specification entry that requires shutdown with an action constraint of 72 hours or less; engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation, half-scam or half-ESF actuation that cannot be immediately reset; failure to control a critical function (level, temperature, pressure) of any of the following: reactor, primary containment, secondary containment, or fuel pool, or loss of any Maintenance Rule High Risk function; degradation of primary or secondary containment; degradation of capability to achieve or maintain cold shutdown; or loss of Emergency Operating Procedure function. NMPNS reviewed components that had previously been classified as Critical to ensure that the classification and PM activities complied with the new procedures.

In 2009, fleet engineering standard CNG-FES-039 "Preventive Maintenance Template Development, Review, Analysis and Application," was issued. This standard states that "PM Template deviations for Critical components should be rarely applied and should only be reserved for severe/hardship situations," for non-conservative deviations. The inspectors identified several differences between the templates and actual PMs completed for NSR breakers, including scope and frequency of clean and inspect of Critical breakers, and thermography of breakers.

In 2008, NMPNS missed an opportunity to re-evaluate if the "clean and inspect" PM task should be performed on NSR MCCBs based on operating experience. In 2008, NRC Information Notice (IN) 08-18 "Loss of a Safety-Related Motor Control Center Caused by a Bus Fault," identified high resistance stab connections as the primary cause of a fire. The IN identified poor PM as one of the causes of the high resistance connection. Upon

receiving IN08-18, NMPNS reviewed the PM templates for safety-related MCCBs, but not NSR MCCBs. In June 2011, NMPNS experienced a fire on a Significant NSR breaker, resulting in the declaration of an Unusual Event.

The differences between the PM templates and actual station practices is unresolved pending inspector determination if a performance deficiency exists and if this issue is more than minor. **(URI 05000220, 410/2011008-01, Inconsistencies Between Non-Safety Related Breaker Preventive Maintenance Templates and Station Practices.**

## .2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience

### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of CRs associated with review of industry operating experience to determine whether Constellation appropriately evaluated the operating experience information for applicability to NMPNS and had taken appropriate actions, when warranted. The inspectors also reviewed evaluations of operating experience documents associated with a sample of NRC generic communications to ensure that Constellation adequately considered the underlying problems associated with the issues for resolution via their corrective action program. In addition, the inspectors observed various plant activities to determine if the station considered industry operating experience during the performance of routine and infrequently performed activities.

### b. Assessment

The inspectors determined that Constellation appropriately considered industry operating experience information for applicability, and used the information for corrective and preventive actions to identify and prevent similar issues when appropriate. The inspectors determined that operating experience was appropriately applied and lessons learned were communicated and incorporated into plant operations and procedures when applicable. The inspectors also observed that industry operating experience was routinely discussed and considered during the conduct of Plan-of-the-Day meetings and pre-job briefs.

### c. Findings

No findings were identified.

## .3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits

### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of audits, including the most recent audit of the corrective action program, departmental self-assessments, and assessments performed by independent organizations. Inspectors performed these reviews to determine if Constellation entered problems identified through these assessments into the corrective action program, when appropriate, and whether Constellation initiated corrective actions to address identified deficiencies. The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the audits and assessments by comparing audit and assessment results against self-revealing and NRC-identified observations made during the inspection.

b. Assessment

The inspectors concluded that self-assessments, audits, and other internal Constellation assessments were generally critical, thorough, and effective in identifying issues. The inspectors observed that Constellation personnel knowledgeable in the subject completed these audits and self-assessments in a methodical manner. Constellation completed these audits and self-assessments to a sufficient depth to identify issues which were then entered into the corrective action program for evaluation. In general, the station implemented corrective actions associated with the identified issues commensurate with their safety significance.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Assessment of Safety Conscious Work Environment

a. Inspection Scope

During interviews with station personnel, the inspectors assessed the safety conscious work environment at NMPNS. Specifically, the inspectors interviewed personnel to determine whether they were hesitant to raise safety concerns to their management and/or the NRC. The inspectors also interviewed the station Employee Concerns Program coordinator to determine what actions are implemented to ensure employees were aware of the program and its availability with regards to raising safety concerns. The inspectors reviewed the Employee Concerns Program files to ensure that Constellation entered issues into the corrective action program when appropriate.

b. Assessment

During interviews, NMPNS staff expressed a willingness to use the corrective action program to identify plant issues and deficiencies and stated that they were willing to raise safety issues. The inspectors noted that no one interviewed stated that they personally experienced or were aware of a situation in which an individual had been retaliated against for raising a safety issue. All persons interviewed demonstrated an adequate knowledge of the corrective action program and the Employee Concerns Program. Based on these limited interviews, the inspectors concluded that there was no evidence of an unacceptable safety conscious work environment and no significant challenges to the free flow of information.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On October 21, 2011, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. George Gellrich, Acting Site Vice President, and other members of the NMPNS staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

Enclosure

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION**

**KEY POINTS OF CONTACT**

**Licensee Personnel**

G. Gellrich, Acting Site Vice President  
M. Flaherty, Acting Plant General Manager  
L. Martiniano, Quality and Performance Assessment  
M. Shanbhag, Licensing  
P Swift, Engineering Manager  
D. Wolniak, Performance Improvement Unit Director

**NRC Personnel**

K. Kolaczyk, Senior Resident Inspector

**LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED**

**Opened**

05000220,410/2011008-01	URI	Inconsistencies Between Non-Safety Related Breaker Preventive Maintenance Templates and Station Practices
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**LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED**

**Section 40A2: Problem Identification and Resolution**

**Audits and Self-Assessments**

CAP-09-01-N, Corrective Action Program Audit Report 2009  
FPP-09-01-N, Fire Protection Audit Report 2009  
MAI-09-01-N, Maintenance Report of Audit 2009  
QPA Assessment Report 09-049, Elective Maintenance Backlog  
QPA Assessment Report 09-083, USA Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment  
QPA Assessment Report 09-092, Stations Response to Liquid Poison Pump Issue  
QPA Assessment Report 11-001, Nine Mile Point-Fleet Type II – Nuclear Safety Culture  
Assessment  
QPA Snap-Shot Self Assessment SA-2010-000082, Fire Brigade Fire Drill Results 2nd/3rd  
Quarter  
QPA Snap-Shot Self Assessment SA-2010-000113, Training Maintenance Training Advisory  
Committee (TAC) Effectiveness  
QPA Snap-Shot Self Assessment SA-2011-000170, Employee Concerns Program (ECP)  
Postings, Office Space and Files

SA-2009-000019, Evaluate Use of OE during Pre-job Briefings  
 SA-2011-000020, Perform An Interim Self-Assessment Of Cat. 1 And 2 Condition Reports  
 SA-2011-000059, Use of OE during N1R21  
 SA-2011-000125, Review of prioritized as Priority 1 OE  
 SA-2011-000142, Chemistry Activities during Work Stoppage  
 SA-2011-000155, Review of 2nd quarter 2011 ALARA Committee Effectiveness

Condition Reports

2001-009673	2009-001128	2009-006914	2010-001400
2006-000336	2009-001413	2009-006961	2010-001429
2006-001730	2009-002620	2009-007029	2010-001431
2006-001772	2009-002726	2009-007129	2010-001457
2006-003352	2009-002973	2009-007201	2010-001546
2006-004642	2009-003026	2009-007417	2010-001657
2007-000236	2009-003209	2009-007442	2010-001901
2007-000433	2009-003225	2009-007457	2010-001969
2007-002332	2009-003384	2009-007589	2010-002002
2007-002709	2009-003394	2009-007624	2010-002003
2007-002745	2009-003415	2009-007838	2010-002004
2007-003706	2009-003526	2009-007964	2010-002202
2007-005412	2009-003632	2009-008024	2010-002352
2007-005538	2009-004195	2009-008089	2010-002356
2007-006012	2009-004308	2009-008141	2010-002574
2007-006582	2009-004914	2009-008156	2010-002586
2007-007051	2009-005044	2009-008157	2010-002685
2007-007074	2009-005091	2009-008248	2010-002755
2007-007255	2009-005398	2009-008503	2010-002985
2008-000095	2009-005520	2009-008503	2010-003060
2008-000240	2009-005943	2009-008747	2010-003738
2008-000818	2009-005983	2009-008787	2010-003746
2008-001177	2009-006003	2009-008795	2010-003899
2008-001212	2009-006022	2009-008848	2010-004110
2008-001511	2009-006165	2009-008928	2010-004132
2008-001806	2009-006238	2010-000101	2010-004257
2008-003241	2009-006244	2010-000192	2010-004408
2008-004001	2009-006299	2010-000195	2010-004703
2008-005483	2009-006305	2010-000195	2010-004727
2008-005611	2009-006370	2010-000239	2010-005289
2008-006698	2009-006396	2010-000429	2010-005303
2008-008189	2009-006526	2010-000604	2010-005380
2009-000779	2009-006564	2010-000629	2010-005550
2009-000812	2009-006701	2010-000701	2010-005653
2009-001093	2009-006838	2010-000782	2010-005702
2009-001115	2009-006906	2010-001048	2010-005709

2010-005985	2010-009163	2011-001831	2011-006404
2010-005997	2010-009344	2011-001833	2011-006507
2010-006069	2010-009502	2011-001845	2011-006579
2010-006122	2010-009721	2011-001968	2011-006753
2010-006250	2010-009756	2011-002036	2011-007017
2010-006253	2010-009919	2011-002556	2011-007034
2010-006253	2010-010023	2011-002566	2011-007104
2010-006261	2010-010057	2011-002692	2011-007171
2010-006518	2010-010366	2011-003005	2011-007234
2010-006647	2010-010407	2011-003063	2011-007269
2010-006647	2010-010832	2011-003266	2011-007382
2010-007112	2010-011008	2011-003628	2011-007469
2010-007218	2010-012039	2011-003758	2011-007482
2010-007412	2010-012327	2011-003857	2011-008227
2010-007473	2011-000143	2011-004047	2011-008263
2010-007752	2011-000257	2011-004407	2011-008364
2010-007752	2011-000358	2011-004408	2011-008640
2010-008024	2011-000389	2011-004459	2011-008657
2010-008025	2011-000421	2011-004536	2011-008659
2010-008245	2011-000511	2011-004687	2011-008660
2010-008443	2011-000799	2011-005023	2011-008718
2010-008444	2011-000820	2011-005024	2011-008757
2010-008481	2011-000865	2011-005592	2011-008810
2010-008481	2011-001131	2011-005652	2011-008913
2010-008508	2011-001253	2011-005712	2011-009216
2010-008595	2011-001476	2011-005993	2011-009387
2010-008645	2011-001543	2011-006079	2011-009403
2010-008723	2011-001593	2011-006266	2011-009410
2010-008834	2011-001656	2011-006273	2011-009411
2010-008858	2011-001801	2011-006399	2011-009514

LERs

NMP1 2009-003-00, Manual Scram and High Pressure Coolant Injection Following a Loss of Feedwater Level Control Due to Firmware Deficiency

NMP1 2010-001-00, Reactor Scram Due to Inadequate Post-Maintenance Testing

NMP1 2011-001-00, Turbine Trip Due to Oil Pressure Fluctuations to the Turbine Master Trip Solenoid

NMP2 2009-001-00, Momentary Loss of Control Power to High Pressure Core Spray Pump Due to Degraded Fuse Block Connection

NMP2 2010-001-01, Reactor Scram Due to Inadvertent Actuation of the Redundant Reactivity Control System During Maintenance

### NCVs and Findings

- Unit 1 NCV 2009005-01, Two APRMs Inoperable Contrary to Procedure Requirement
- Unit 2 NCV 2009009-01, Failure to Identify Procedural Inadequacies and Non-Compliances that Contributed to the November 4, 2008, SW Pumps Foreign Material Intrusion Events
- Unit 1 FIN 2009010-01, Failure to Properly Scope the SPDS Function of the Plant Process Computer into the Maintenance Rule
- Unit 2 FIN 2010002-01, Inadequate Maintenance Procedure Results in Loss of Loads for Non-Vital UPS
- Unit 2 NCV 2010002-02, Inadequate Performance Testing of Division 1 Battery
- Unit 2 NCV 2010002-03, Reactor Scram Due to Inadequate Procedure for RHR Detector Restoration
- Unit 2 NCV 2010003-01, Excessive Reactor Pressure Vessel Drain Down Due to Inadequate Procedure
- Unit 2 FIN 2010004-01, Failure to Maintain Radiation Exposure ALARA During RHR System Modification
- Unit 2 FIN 2010004-02, Failure to Maintain Radiation Exposure ALARA During Refueling Floor Activities
- Unit 1 NCV 2010005-01, Reactor Scram due to Inadequate Post-Maintenance Testing
- Unit 2 NCV 2011002-01, Inadequate Identification and Corrective Actions for Emergency Diesel Generator Temperature Control Valve Degradation
- Unit 1 NCV 2011002-02, Inadequate Corrective Actions to Correct Motor Control Center Spring Clip Engagement Issues
- Unit 1 FIN 2011003-01, Inadequate Procedural Guidance for Main Turbine and Generator Maintenance Activities

### Operating Experience

- OE-2009-002707, IN09-16 Spurious Relay Actuations Result in Loss of Power to Safeguards Buses
- OE-2009-003154, IN09-26 Degradation of Neutron-absorbing Materials in the Spent Fuel Pool
- OE-2010-000540, IN10-06 Inadvertent Control Rod Withdraw Event While Shutdown
- OE-2010-001171, TYCO (Part 21) Vendor Notification #45862
- OE-2010-001979, GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (Part 21) Vendor Notification #46060
- OE-2010-002172, IN10-13 Failure to Ensure that Post-fire Shutdown Procedure can be Performed
- OE-2010-002366, Braidwood - SCRAM #46178
- OE-2010-002764, IN10-20 Turbine-Drive Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Repetitive Failures
- OE-2010-002923, IN10-21 Crack-like Indication in the U-bend Region of a Thermally Treated Alloy 600 Steam Generator Tube
- OE-2011-000338, IN11-02 Operator Performance Issues Involving Reactivity Management at Nuclear Power Plants
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- OE-2011-001601, Fitzpatrick (Part 21) Log No. 2011-32-00
- OE-2011-001861, IN11-14 Component Cooling Water System Gas Accumulation and Other Performance Issues

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**LIST OF ACRONYMS**

ADAMS	Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CR	Condition Report
DRP	Division of Reactor Projects
EDG	Emergency Diesel Generator
EPRI	Electric Power Research Institute
ESF	Engineered Safety Feature
IMC	Inspection Manual Chapter
IN	Information Notice
MCCB	Molded-Case Circuit Breaker
NCV	Non-Cited Violation
NMPNS	Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSR	Non-Safety Related
PARS	Publicly Available Records System
PCM	Performance Centered Maintenance
PM	Preventive Maintenance
SDP	Significance Determination Process
SRV	Safety Relief Valve
TS	Technical Specifications
URI	Unresolved Item